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INTRODUCTION
As a matter of practice, many seemingly gender-neutral laws addressing
the transmission of sexually transmitted disease, assisted reproduction, 1 and
child support treat males unfairly. These laws impose parental obligations on
males who have been forced into parenthood (through contraceptive fraud, 2
sexual assault, or statutory rape), in spite of Supreme Court decisions, which
emphasize the values of privacy and autonomy in sexual relations and the
decision whether to reproduce. 3 These same values of privacy and autonomy
form the basis for state courts’ decisions not to interfere with personal relations
by aiding male victims of contraceptive fraud, who are victims of a sexual
partner’s “misrepresentation. . .[of] . . .sterility or use of some form of birth
control.”4 By imposing child support obligations on male sexual assault and
male statutory rape victims, courts disregard the complete absence of autonomy
involved in these males’ reproduction, as they never had the opportunity to
decide whether to reproduce. On the other hand, when a person is infected by a
sexually transmitted disease courts are willing to provide compensation to a
victim who unwillingly acquires the disease, even though both male
contraceptive fraud victims and individuals who have contracted sexually
transmitted diseases often failed to take the same precaution. 5 In sum, privacy
1. What is Assisted Reproductive Technology?, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION http://www.cdc.gov/art/ (last updated Aug. 1, 2012) (“[Assisted reproductive
technology] includes all fertility treatments in which both eggs and sperm are handled. In
general, ART procedures involve surgically removing eggs from a woman’s ovaries,
combining them with sperm in the laboratory, and returning them to the woman’s body [as
embryos] or donating them to another woman. They do NOT include treatments in which
only sperm are handled (i.e., intrauterine—or artificial—insemination) or procedures in
which a woman takes medicine only to stimulate egg production without the intention of
having eggs retrieved.”).
2. Sally Sheldon, ‘Sperm Bandits’, Birth Control Fraud and the Battle of the Sexes, 21
LEGAL STUD. 460, 463 (2001). Contraceptive fraud, which will be explored in detail in the
article, is also referred to as “birth control fraud” or “sperm banditry.” See id. at 460-80.
3. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972).
4. Sheldon, supra note 2, at 463.
5. See Matthew Seth Sarelson, Toward a More Balanced Treatment of the Negligent
Transmission of Sexually Transmitted Diseases and AIDS, 12 GEO. MASON LAW REV. 481,
508 (2003) (discussing the difference in legal treatment of sexually transmitted disease
transmission and unwanted pregnancy: “You cannot sue for ‘wrongful birth’ but you can sue
for disease transmission; this is so even though the underlying facts constituting the
wrongful birth or disease transmission are often identical. For example, in California, a
father cannot sue the mother of his unwanted child on the grounds that she lied when she
claimed to be using birth control pills. However, a man is liable if he negligently, or
intentionally for that matter, fails to disclose he has genital herpes. In both cases one partner
lied to the other, apparently in an effort to ‘reassure’ the partner that the sex would be ‘safe.’
Both plaintiffs were harmed—an unwanted child, an unwanted disease. Why the
distinction?”); see also infra note 51.
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and autonomy give way to public health concerns when a disease is
transmitted, but courts yield to these same concepts when rejecting male
contraceptive fraud claims and the claims of male sexual assault and statutory
rape victims.
This article conducts a detailed exploration of the legal environment
where male contraceptive fraud, sexual assault, and statutory rape victims are
punished with child support liability, even though they are victims of deception
or actual crimes. After addressing the consequences of sex or artificial
insemination, with the exception of embryo disposition upon divorce and the
complexities of the marital presumption in family law, this article offers three
solutions to the mistreatment of males in family law:
1) A statute that compensates male victims of contraceptive fraud, sexual
assault, and statutory rape for the use of their sperm, as if they had
been sperm donors;
2) A revision of child support guidelines that results in a reduction or
elimination of child support liability for victims of contraceptive
fraud, sexual assault, and statutory rape;
3) A “just cause” exception for child support in cases of male statutory
rape, contraceptive fraud, and sexual assault victims.
If implemented, these solutions would result in a legal environment where
male contraceptive fraud, sexual assault, and statutory rape victims are not
punished with child support liability, but instead receive compensation for the
unauthorized use of their biological products.
These proposed statutory provisions also address the market-based and
financial inconsistencies that occur as a result of state court decisions by
creating compensatory regimes for victims of contraceptive fraud, sexual
assault, and statutory rape. After fertilization, 6 the legal treatment of sperm and
eggs shifts them from commodities to liabilities. 7 Eggs and sperm are worth
money at the time they leave the host and before conception, but after they
enter another’s body, these market-based concerns are no longer the primary
consideration.8 Thus, the biological market effectively ends upon fertilization.

6. Fertilization is the successful entrance of a sperm into an egg, resulting in an
embryo and ultimately, a child; see How Your Baby Grows During Pregnancy, AMERICAN
COLLEGE
OF
OBSTETRICIANS
AND
GYNECOLOGISTS,
http://www.acog.org/~/media/For%20Patients/faq156.pdf?dmc=1&ts=20120907T18032822
20 (last visited Sept. 7, 2012).
7. See Claudia Dreifus, A Conversation with Debora Spar: An Economist Examines
the
Business
of
Fertility,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Feb.
28,
2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/28/health/28conv.html?pagewanted=all,
for
more
information on the market for human eggs and sperm; see also Peggy Orenstein, In Vitro We
Trust, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/20/magazine/20wwlnlede-t.html. When sex results in the birth of a child, the parents are both liable for the support
of the child, while anonymous sperm donors are generally absolved of liability. See
generally Katharine K. Baker, Bargaining or Biology? The History and Future of Paternity
Law and Paternal Status, 14 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 10 (2004).
8. See Dreifus, supra note 7.
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After conception, even males who have become “involuntary sperm donors”
through contraceptive fraud, sexual assault, or statutory rape, are not
compensated for their bodies’ products and are punished with legal liability,
mainly through the imposition of child support. 9 By harmonizing the legal
treatment of sexual relations with that of assisted reproductive technology, the
monetary aspects of sex, 10 and compensation for the donation of sperm and
eggs, these related concepts will share a common legal foundation and resultant
treatment.
I. ARTICLE MODEL
The integral parts of reproduction are allotted a monetary value in the
fertility market and are a source of income for donors before fertilization
occurs. Yet, after a woman is pregnant with a fertilized egg, the male who
provided the fertilizing sperm, either voluntarily or through fraud or assault,
may be monetarily liable through the imposition of child support obligations.
The word “may” is used in the preceding sentence because anonymous sperm
donors who participate in assisted reproductive technology 11 escape child
support liability, while male victims of contraceptive fraud, sexual assault, or
statutory rape are legally required to support the child that results from the use
of their sperm.12 This is particularly shocking in light of state courts’ statements
implying a right to avoid procreation. 13 Thus, this article examines how the
9. The term “involuntary sperm ‘donors’” here refers to men who are victims of
contraceptive fraud. Even though these men would be compensated for the use of their
sperm had they donated it at a sperm bank, they are punished with child support liability for
the use of their sperm through sex. The parallel term of “involuntary sperm ‘donor’” was
used because later in this article, I will discuss the case of S.F. v. ex rel. T.M, in which a
female had sex with an unconscious man and later told him that it “saved her a trip to the
sperm bank.” See discussion infra pp. 18, 22-23; see also Laura W. Morgan, Child Support
Fifty Years Later, 42 FAM. L.Q. 365, 371-2 (2008) (“The courts have even gone so far as to
hold a biological father liable for child support when he was the victim of sexual assault”).
10. Some examples include child support and compensation for the transmission of
disease
11. Assisted reproductive technology is generally the “[surgical] remov[al] of eggs
from a woman’s ovaries, [the] combin[ation of] them with sperm in the laboratory, and [the
subsequent] return[. . . of] them to the woman’s body [as embryos] or donat[ion of] them to
another woman.” What is Assisted Reproductive Technology?, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL
& PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/art/ (last updated Aug. 1, 2012). While the CDC does
not use the term to apply to “treatments in which only sperm are handled (i.e., intrauterine—
or artificial—insemination) or procedures in which a woman takes medicine only to
stimulate egg production without the intention of having eggs retrieved,” in this article, the
term will refer to intrauterine or artificial insemination. Id.
12. See discussion infra Part IV: Three Situations in which Males are Treated Unfairly
in Family Law as Evidenced by Inconsistent Imposition of Child Support Liability.
13. See Melissa Boatman, Bringing Up Baby: Maryland Must Adopt an Equitable
Framework for Resolving Frozen Embryo Disputes After Divorce, 37 U. BALT. L. REV. 285,
308 (2008) (“[C]ourts generally have concluded that the right to avoid procreation outweighs
the right to biological parenthood.”); see also Sorrel v. Henson, No. 02A01-9609-JV-00212,
1998 WL 886561, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 18, 1998) (“Our own Tennessee Supreme
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results of sex or reproduction are treated differently depending on the location
of the biological product within the “reproductive spheres” established below. 14
In some ways, this model operates as a family law “balance sheet” and shows
the situations where sperm can be an asset and where it can be a liability.

Figure 1

Liability
•Consensual Sex
•Non-consensual Sex
(Sexual Assault,
Contraceptive Fraud,
Statutory Rape)
•Transmitter of sexually
transmitted disease

Mixed
Treatment
- Known
sperm
donation

Income /Asset
•Anonymous sperm
donation
•Anonymous egg donation

By analyzing the legal treatment of sex, the model statutes discussed later
attempt to harmonize the law and, therefore, eliminate these variant spheres.
II. PRE-FERTILIZATION “FREE” MARKET VERSUS POST-FERTILIZATION STRICT
LIABILITY
The fertility industry offers assisted reproductive technology, including
sperm and eggs for purchase, for individuals facing difficulty in conceiving a
child. Anonymous sperm donation is often an important aspect of assisted
reproductive technology. 15 Artificial insemination statutes vary from state to

Court has stated, “the right of procreational autonomy is composed of two rights of equal
significance-the right to procreate and the right to avoid procreation.” (quoting Davis v.
Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn.1992))).
14. See infra Figure 1.
15. See Infertility FAQs, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
http://www.cdc.gov/reproductivehealth/infertility/#16 (last updated Apr. 19, 2012), for a
general overview of assisted reproductive technology. See, for example, Jacqueline Mroz,
One
Sperm
Donor,
150
Offspring,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Sept.
5,
2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/06/health/06donor.html?pagewanted=all; William Heisel,
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state.16 These statutes establish the lack of parental rights and obligations for
egg and sperm donors and, combined with the marital presumption, identify
when husbands are deemed to be fathers of the children conceived through
artificial insemination. 17
As of 2008, the fertility industry is a $3 billion-per-year sector of the
medical economy.18 In addition, the fertility industry is characterized as a “selfregulated” industry. 19 There are federal regulations, but they are limited:
“[f]ederal [regulations of] the health of donated tissue. . .requir[e] that donors
undergo certain tests for diseases like AIDS. . .[which] does not otherwise
regulate the process in any significant way. It does not preclude the sale of
eggs, sperm, or embryos.”20 State regulations of the fertility industry also exist
but are often not very restrictive beyond testing requirements for diseases. 21
Now, sperm and eggs are available from donors who are compensated at
rates that range from $60-75 for sperm donation22 (and up to $100 for men with
graduate degrees) 23 to $8,000 for egg donors from university hospitals24 and
Registry May Track Egg, Sperm Donors, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2008,
http://articles.latimes.com/2008/jan/03/local/me-eggs3, for news accounts
16. See Anonymous v. Anonymous, 1991 WL 57753, at *4 (N.Y.S. Jan. 18, 1991).
17. Laura W.W. v. Peter W.W., 51 A.D.3d 211, 217 (N.Y.S. 2008) (“Consistent with
our State’s strong presumption of legitimacy, as well as the compelling public policy of
protecting children conceived via AID, we follow the lead of other jurisdictions that impose
a rebuttable presumption of consent by the husband of a woman who conceives by AID,
shifting the burden to the husband to rebut the presumption by clear and convincing
evidence.” (citing In re Baby Doe, 291 SC at 391, 353 SE2d at 878; K. S. v G. S., 182 NJ
Super 102, 109, 440 A2d 64, 68 [1981]; People v Sorensen, 68 Cal 2d 280, 283, 437 P2d
495, 497 [1968]; but see Jackson v Jackson, 137 Ohio App 3d 782, 795, 739 NE2d 1203,
1213 [2000] [burden on wife to prove consent by a preponderance of the evidence])).
18. See Dreifus, supra note 7; Orenstein, supra note 7. Another source states that
fertility is a $3 billion to $4 billion per year business. NAOMI L. CAHN, TEST TUBE FAMILIES:
WHY THE FERTILITY MARKET NEEDS LEGAL REGULATION 1 (2009); see generally DEBORA L.
SPAR, THE BABY BUSINESS: HOW MONEY, SCIENCE, AND POLITICS DRIVE THE COMMERCE OF
CONCEPTION, 40-41 (2006).
19. Orenstein, supra note 7.
20. CAHN, supra note 18, at 18-19.
21. See Vanessa L. Pi, Regulating Sperm Donation: Why Requiring Exposed Donation
Is Not the Answer, 16 DUKE J. GEN. LAW & POL’Y 379, 384 (2009) (discussing state
regulation of sperm donation); see also Sarah Terman, Marketing Motherhood: Rights and
Responsibilities of Egg Donors in Assisted Reproductive Technology Agreements, 3 NW. J.
L. & SOC. POL’Y 167 (2008) (discussing state regulation of egg donation).
22. See Martha M. Ertman, What’s Wrong with a Parenthood Market?, 82 N.C. L.
REV. 1, 14 (2003) (stating that sperm donors are compensated $60 per donation); see also
SPAR, supra note 18, at 39 (“[Donors] contribute a fixed number of times over a relatively
short period and receive around $75 per specimen”).
23. Jennifer Anyaegbunam, Ivy League Women Get Offers for Their Eggs, CNN
HEALTH (Aug. 12, 2009), http://thechart.blogs.cnn.com/2009/08/12/ivy-league-women-getoffers-for-their-eggs/.
24. Egg Donation: Compensation, CORNELL UNIV. JOAN & SANFORD I. WEILL MED.
COLL. http://www.eggdonorcornell.com (last visited Mar. 20, 2011); Becoming an Egg
Donor, NYU LANGONE MED. CTR., http://www.nyueggdonor.org/egg-donor-compensation
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even up to $100,000 for the eggs of well-educated women.25 Vials of sperm sell
to prospective parents for $250 to $400 each, and eggs generally sell for
$4,500.26 However, family law only compensates males for the use of their
biological products if their sperm successfully fertilizes an egg under
conditions created in a physician’s office, not in the private arena.
III. CHILD SUPPORT OVERVIEW
Family law’s inconsistent treatment of certain males manifests mainly
through the unfair imposition of child support obligations. Child support is “a
parent’s legal obligation to contribute to the economic maintenance and
education of a child until the age of majority, the child’s emancipation before
reaching majority, or the child’s completion of secondary education. The
obligation is enforceable both civilly and criminally.” 27 In the present legal
environment, if a male and female engage in sex that results in a child,
regardless of the voluntariness or legality of the sexual intercourse, both parties
are responsible for the child’s support.28 Every state has a child support
program, for which the state receives assistance from the federal government in
enforcement.29 Furthermore, parents cannot bargain away child support through
private contract because it belongs to the child, even though state law allows
“anonymous” egg and sperm donors to do exactly that.30 Of course, anonymous
sperm donors are not truly anonymous, as sperm banks keep track of the sperm
donation source, and some sperm banks even allow women to pick donors
based on the donors’ characteristics. 31 These men provided their sperm
voluntarily, received compensation for it, and have no parental rights or
obligations, while the victims of contraceptive fraud, sexual assault, or
statutory rape provided their sperm involuntarily. It is worth noting that legal
parentage does not only result in obligatory monetary outlays but also involves
parental rights. While many males do not want child support liability, many
females also do not want additional persons with parental rights or obligations
(last visited Apr. 23, 2011) (“You will receive $8,000 to compensate for your time, effort
and inconvenience, which is paid in full by NYU School of Medicine.”).
25. Anyaegbunam, supra note 23.
26. SPAR, supra note 18, at 39. The typical cost of sperm is $300 and the typical cost
of eggs is $4,500. Id. at 213.
27. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 257 (8th ed. 2004).
28. Ellen London, A Critique of the Strict Liability Standard for Determining Child
Support in Cases of Male Victims of Sexual Assault and Rape, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1957,
1958 (2004).
29. See State and Tribal Child Support Agency Contacts, OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT
ENFORCEMENT http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cse/extinf.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2011).
30. See Budnick v. Silverman, 805 So. 2d 1112, 1113 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002);
Bassett v. Saunders, 835 So. 2d 1198, 1201 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002); see also Michael H.
v. Gerald D, 491 U.S. 110, 130-31 (1989) (demonstrating minimization of children’s rights).
31. One sperm bank that allows this donor selection is the California Cryobank. See
Selecting a Sperm Bank, CAL. CRYOBANK, http://www.cryobank.com/Why-UseUs/Selecting-a-Sperm-Bank/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2012).
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involved in their or their children’s lives. 32 Thus, the historical basis for child
support—the nuclear family—is no longer a reality or a desired ideal for many
parents.33
The constitutional foundation of state judicial analysis of reproduction and
sexually transmitted disease transmission is the right to privacy. The basis of
this right, which is often referred to as procreational autonomy, 34 stems from
landmark Supreme Court decisions that focus on personal autonomy in the
reproductive sphere. 35 These decisions about reproduction and procreational
autonomy should operate to equalize males and females, but their focus on
female autonomy renders the general themes of individualism and autonomy
for all persons, including men, unnoticed.
While state court decisions, Supreme Court decisions, and commentators
often emphasize the rights of privacy and autonomy as constitutional rights,
“[t]he Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of
privacy. . .[however, since 1891] the Court has recognized that a right of
personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist
32. Steven S. v. Deborah D., 25 Cal. Rptr. 3d 482, 486 (127 Cal. App. 4th 2005)
(“Our Legislature has already spoken and has afforded to unmarried women a statutory right
to bear children by artificial insemination (as well as a right of men to donate semen) without
fear of a paternity claim, through provision of the semen to a licensed physician.” [ . . . ] The
Legislature “has likewise provided men with a statutory vehicle for donating semen to
married and unmarried women alike without fear of liability for child support. Subdivision
(b) states only one limitation on its application: the semen must be ‘provided to a licensed
physician.’”).
33. See, e.g., Diana B. Elliott, How Nuclear is the Nuclear Family?: Extended Family
Investments in Children
(2008) (unpublished Ph.D dissertation) available at
http://drum.lib.umd.edu/bitstream/1903/8753/1/umi-umd-5772.pdf (“Our understanding of
what a family is emerges from the Ozzie and Harriet era of the 1950s, but does not reflect
the multiplicity of family forms in the United States today (Stacey 1996). As Judith Stacey
(1996) eloquently writes, ‘The family is indeed dead, if what we mean by it is the modern
family system in which units comprised of male breadwinner and female homemaker,
married couples, and their offspring dominate the land. But its ghost, the ideology of the
family, survives to haunt the consciousness of all those who refuse to confront it,” (p. 49).”).
See James R. Wetzel, American Families: 75 Years of Change, 132 MONTHLY LABOR REV. 4
(1990), available at http://www.bls.gov/mlr/1990/03/art1full.pdf, for additional information
on the nuclear family.
34. See Christopher Bruno, A Right to Decide Not to Be a Legal Father: Gonzales v.
Carhart and the Acceptance of Emotional Harm as a Constitutionally Protected Interest, 77
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 141, 150 (2008) (“Because a father has a right not to procreate, and
because a declaration of legal paternity can cause emotional harm that burdens a father’s
ability to define himself and his procreational realm, a declaration of legal paternity may
violate the father’s right to procreational autonomy.”), for more information on procreational
autonomy. See Sorrel, No. 02A01-9609-JV-00212 at *3 (“Our own Tennessee Supreme
Court has stated, ‘the right of procreational autonomy is composed of two rights of equal
significance-the right to procreate and the right to avoid procreation.’ (quoting Davis v.
Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn.1992))), for a discussion of procreational autonomy in a state
court case addressing contraceptive fraud.
35. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973),
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under the Constitution.”36 One of these zones of privacy is the sphere of
reproduction.37 It is for this reason that the Supreme Court “conclude[d in Roe]
that the right of personal privacy includes the abortion decision, but that this
right is not unqualified and must be considered against important state interests
in regulation.” 38 In Eisenstadt v. Baird, the Supreme Court also protected the
right of privacy in the reproductive context. The Supreme Court reasoned that
“[i]f the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual,
married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into
matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or
beget a child.” 39 This reasoning has inspired state courts to identify a “right to
procreational autonomy”, 40 which is a re-characterization of the right to privacy
identified in Roe v. Wade and Eisenstaedt v. Baird. The right to procreational
autonomy has been mentioned in several state courts’ decisions. For example, a
Tennessee court deciding whether a contraceptive fraud victim should be liable
for child support noted that “[o]ur own Tennessee Supreme Court has stated,
‘the right of procreational autonomy is composed of two rights of equal
significance-the right to procreate and the right to avoid procreation.’” 41
Yet, just as the right to abortion is subject to the limitations of state
interests in regulation, the right to procreational autonomy is also subject to
limitations. For example, courts note that a male’s right to avoid procreation is
not infringed upon by contraceptive fraud.42 Decisions state that male victims
of contraceptive fraud still could have used contraception 43 in order to combat
36. Roe, 410 U.S. at 176.
37. See id. at 152 (noting the many spheres of life that privacy entails).
38. Id. at 154.
39. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453.
40. See Sorrel v. Henson, No. 02A01-9609-JV-00212, 1998 WL 886561, at *3 (Tenn.
Ct. App. Dec. 18, 1998) (example of state court identification of procreational autonomy);
see, e.g., Charla M. Burill, Obtaining Procreational Autonomy Through the Utilization of
Default Rules in Embryo Cryopreservation Agreements: Indefinite Freezing Equals an
Indefinite Solution, 55 WAYNE L. REV. 1365, 1371 (2008).
41. Sorrel, 1998 WL 886561, at *2 (citing Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588
(Tenn.1992)).
42. See, e.g., L. Pamela P. v. Frank S., 449 N.E.2d 713 (N.Y. 1983); Sorrel, 1998 WL
886561 at *3 (“Other related cases from other jurisdictions have generally dealt with
instances wherein either the mother misrepresented to the putative father that she was
practicing birth control, or the putative father offered to pay for an abortion. Each such case,
however, supports the conclusion that paternity actions do not deprive a putative father of his
Fourteenth Amendment right to procreational autonomy simply because he did not “consent”
to childbirth” (citing Beard v. Skipper, 182 Mich.App. 352, 451 N.W.2d 614, 615
(Mich.App.1990) (quoting L. Pamela P. and holding, ‘We see no reason why Michigan
should decide this issue differently’); Faske v. Bonanno, 137 Mich.App. 202, 357 N.W.2d
860, 861 (Mich.App.1984); Linda D. v. Fritz C., 38 Wash.App. 288, 687 P.2d 223, 228
(Wash.App.1984) (citing L. Pamela P. and holding that the constitutionally protected right
of privacy does not ‘encompass the right of one parent to avoid a child support obligation
where the other parent’s choice regarding procreation is not fully respected’) Erwin L.D. v.
Myla Jean L., 41 Ark.App. 16, 847 S.W.2d 45, 47 (Ark.App.1993))).
43. Wallis v. Smith, 22 P.3d 682, 683 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001).
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one of the “natural results of consensual sexual intercourse”–childbirth.44 These
decisions further state that a “respondent’s constitutional entitlement to avoid
procreation does not encompass a right to avoid a child support obligation
simply because another private person has not fully respected his desires in this
regard.”45 In this way, courts are recognizing that both males and females have
the right to use contraception, as guaranteed to all married or single persons, 46
but if a person decides to not use contraception due to the representations of his
or her sexual partner, state courts decided that this does not rise to the level of a
constitutional violation.
Courts permit successful legal actions against partners who transmit
sexually transmitted diseases, but not against partners who engage in the same
act of unprotected sex to dupe someone into becoming a parent against his
will.47 In Stephen K. v. Roni L., a contraceptive fraud cause of action, the
California Court of Appeal “conclude[d] that as a matter of public policy the
practice of birth control, if any, engaged in by two partners in a consensual
sexual relationship is best left to the individuals involved, free from any
governmental interference.”48 This public policy characterization parallels the
language of the aforementioned Supreme Court decision, Eistenstadt v. Baird,49
which held that married and unmarried persons had the same right to
contraception under the Equal Protection clause of the U.S. Constitution
because the right to privacy freed individuals from governmental interference
into matters such as “the decision whether to bear or beget a child.” 50
Contraception enables the individual to control, to a certain extent,
whether a sexual relationship will result in a child. Condoms, one form of
commonly used contraception, aid in preventing the spread of sexually
transmitted diseases.51 If individuals can decide whether to bear or beget a child
through contraceptives, and diseases are transmitted and prevented in the same
manner as children, then disease transmission and unwanted parenthood should
not be treated in a legally different manner; causes of action for both should be

44. Stephen K. v. Roni L., 164 Cal. Rptr. 618, 619 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980).
45. L. Pamela P., 449 N.E.2d at 713, 716. In this case, a contraceptive fraud victim
argued that the “deliberate misrepresentation of the mother concerning her use of
contraception” served as a defense to his child support obligation. Id. at 714. The Court of
Appeals of New York rejected this argument. Id.
46. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 438 (1972)
47. Michelle Oberman, Sex, Lies, and the Duty to Disclose, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 871, 892
(2005).
48. Stephen K., 164 Cal. Rptr. at 621.
49. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453.
50. Id. (“We need not, and do not, however, decide that important question in this
case, because, whatever the rights of the individual to access to contraceptives may be, the
rights must be the same for the unmarried and the married alike.”).
51. See Behr v. Redmond, 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d 97 111 (Cal. App. 4 Dist. 2011); Wallis
v. Smith, 22 P.3d 682, 683 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001); S.F. v. State ex rel. T.M., 695 So. 2d
1186, 1188 (Ala. 1997), for examples of cases in which no condoms were used.
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successful.52 Instead, decisions state that male victims of contraceptive fraud
still could have used contraception in order to prevent conception. 53
It is incongruous to support a “public policy” that opposes the
transmission of sexually transmitted diseases but simultaneously asserts that
“as a matter of public policy the practice of birth control, if any, engaged in by
two partners in a consensual sexual relationship is best left to the individuals
involved, free from any governmental interference.” 54 Both sexually
transmitted diseases and pregnancy are risks of sex, so both of these results
should be actionable. In some ways, courts have selected the cause of action
that has less need of protection. Even though awards for the transmission of
sexually transmitted diseases include compensatory damages, 55 the medications
for sexually transmitted disease treatment are generally covered by insurance or
available at low-cost providers, such as Planned Parenthood. 56 On the other
hand, there is no aid available for child support payments; child support is an
individual undertaking, excluding the provision of governmental support for the
economically disadvantaged. 57 Today’s social context where the nuclear family
is disappearing renders this suggested “obligation” weaker.
An example that highlights the financial disparity between the legal
treatment of sexually transmitted disease transmission and childbirth is a
California judgment for the transmission of herpes. Recently, a defendant was
ordered by the California Court of Appeal to pay his sexual partner $72,000 in
future prescription medication expenses, $1,575,600 in compensatory damages
for the negligent transmission of genital herpes,58 and $2.75 million in punitive

52. See Matthew Seth Sarelson, Toward a More Balanced Treatment of the Negligent
Transmission of Sexually Transmitted Diseases and AIDS, 12 GEO. MASON L. REV. 481, 509
(2003); see also Oberman, supra note 47, at 892.
53. Wallis, 22 P.3d at 685; see also Stephen K., 164 Cal. Rptr. at 621.
54. Barbara A. v. John G., 145 Cal. App. 3d 369, 378 (1983) (quoting Stephen K. v.
Roni L., 105 Cal. App. 3d. 640, 645 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980)).
55. See, e.g. Behr v. Redmond, 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d 97 111 (Cal. App. 4 Dist. 2011);
Duke v. Housen, 589 P.2d 334, 340 (Wyo. 1979) (summarizing tortious actions in other
states for the transmission of diseases).
56.
See
Health
Info
&
Services,
PLANNED
PARENTHOOD,
http://plannedparenthood.org/health-center/ (last visited July 25, 2012) (stating that local
Planned Parenthood health centers provide STD testing, treatment, and vaccines); see, e.g.,
Richmond
Health
Center
–
Richmond,
VA,
PLANNED
PARENTHOOD,
http://www.plannedparenthood.org/ (enter “Richmond Health Center” in “site search” bar,
select first result).
57. See Leslie Joan Harris, The Basis for Legal Parentage and the Clash Between
Custody and Child Support, 42 IND. L. REV. 611, 620 (2009) (“The Temporary Assistance
for Needy Families (TANF) program requires states to seek to establish the paternity of
children born to unmarried mothers for purposes of imposing child support obligations on
the men. If states do not meet federally-mandated paternity establishment goals, they will
lose TANF funds, and states with paternity establishment rates above 50% receive incentive
payments that increase as the rate increases.“).
58. Behr, 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 113, 116.
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damages.59 Thus, it can cost a defendant over $3 million to infect a sexual
partner with a disease and nothing to convert a male into an involuntary parent
even though the “cost of raising a child from birth to age 18 for a middleincome, two-parent family averaged $226,920 last year (not including college),
according to the U.S. Department of Agriculture.” 60
IV. THREE SITUATIONS IN WHICH MALES ARE TREATED UNFAIRLY IN FAMILY
LAW AS EVIDENCED BY INCONSISTENT IMPOSITION OF CHILD SUPPORT LIABILITY
A. Contraceptive Fraud
Contraceptive fraud, the least legally successful claim of those analyzed in
this article, is the first situation meriting a reduction or elimination of child
support obligations. A major reason for the rejection of contraceptive fraud
claims is that courts view these contraceptive fraud claims as attempts to reduce
or “[adjust] a natural parent’s obligation to pay child support.” 61 Admittedly,
enacting a law reducing or eliminating child support obligations for male
victims of sexual assault, statutory rape, and contraceptive fraud would create
an opportunity for males to use the law as a means of avoiding child support
obligations. This opportunity would be most attractive to men who had
unprotected sex without any deception because they would be able to more
easily argue for contraceptive fraud. There would be resultant evidentiary
difficulties if such a law existed; every “man could claim that his partner led
him to believe that she was taking oral contraceptives and therefore breached
her duty to disclose that she was not using contraception.”62 Yet, the law limits
its own application because it is generally difficult to find evidence of
contraceptive fraud in a sexual relationship. 63 The only evidence would likely
be a “confession” from a female. This is indeed possible because there has been
a recorded case of a woman who has admitted that she defrauded the
contraceptive fraud victim. 64 A contraceptive fraud statute could encourage
more males who have been defrauded to pursue legal remedies. Even if a
partner’s declarations about birth control cannot be proven, when female

59. Id. at 115.
60. Jessica Dickler, The Rising Cost of Raising a Child, CNN MONEY (Sept. 21, 2011),
http://money.cnn.com/2011/09/21/pf/cost_raising_child/index.htm.
61. Wallis v. Smith, 22 P.3d 682, 684 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001).
62. Oberman, supra note 47, at 918.
63. See Bryn Ann Poland, He Said, She Said: Diverging Views in the Emerging Field
of Father’s Rights, 46 WASHBURN L.J. 163, 173 (2006) (“The intimate nature of the act
usually provides no witnesses or other tangible evidence to prove whether a
misrepresentation was made or, if it was, whether the other party relied on it when engaging
in sexual conduct. Moreover, recognition of tort principles would potentially create an
incentive for abortion.”).
64. Sorrel v. Henson, No. 02A01-9609-JV-00212, 1998 WL 886561, at *1 (Tenn. Ct.
App. Dec. 18, 1998) (“Sorrell admits that she did not inform Henson about stopping the birth
control pills, and the parties did not engage in any alternative form of birth control.”).
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defendants admit that they were taking birth control and then stopped, courts
should rule in favor of contraceptive fraud victims. 65 Thus, although a statute
that would reduce or eliminate child support liability for contraceptive fraud
victims appears extreme, its applicability would be very limited.
B. Sexual Assault
A second situation meriting an elimination or reduction in child support is
the sexual assault of a man that results in a pregnancy and subsequent
childbirth. An example of male sexual assault resulting in parental obligations
is S.F. v. ex rel. T.M., an Alabama case in which a woman had non-consensual
sex with an intoxicated, unconscious man several times, resulting in her
pregnancy and the birth of a child. 66 This male victim, who was unconscious at
the time of conception, was held liable for child support. 67 The sexual assault of
an intoxicated, unconscious woman would undoubtedly immediately result in
an outcry for justice. Such a woman would face less scrutiny for not wanting to
take care of a child that would result from such an assault, if the child were
ever born.68
In this sphere of female sympathy, S.F., the male rape victim,
unsuccessfully pled to the courts for equitable treatment. S.F “contended that
the court, acting in equity, could abate any child support payments due because
of what he alleged to be T.M.’s sexual assault upon him.” 69 This claim was
rejected and illustrates why a statute is necessary to equitably abate child
support and reduce the reliance upon judicial independence.
C. Statutory Rape
The third situation with unfair child support obligations is statutory rape.
As underage victims70 cannot legally consent to sex, the logical result should be
that male statutory rape victims cannot unwillingly become legal parents with
child support obligations. 71 Instead, the opposite occurs and statutory rapes
serve as a predicate for civil liability in the form of child support payments. 72
65. Id.
66. S.F. v. State ex rel. T.M., 695 So. 2d 1186, 1188 (Ala. 1997).
67. Id. at 1187, 1190.
68. Ruth Jones, Inequality from Gender-Neutral Laws: Why Must Male Victims of
Statutory Rape Pay Child Support for Children Resulting from their Victimization?, 36 GA.
L. REV. 411, 412 (2002) (“Specifically, statutory rape laws are being enforced according to
cultural stereotypes of women as sexual victims and men as sexual aggressors.”).
69. S.F., 695 So. 2d. at 1187.
70. I use the word “victims” to place an emphasis on unwilling males as it is clear that
underage persons can be parents as evidenced by young pregnant women. Yet, these women
have some control over the imposition of biological and legal parenthood through the
previously discussed right to abortion.
71. E. Gary Spitko, The Constitutional Function of Biological Paternity: Evidence of
the Biological Mother’s Consent to the Biological Father’s Co-Parenting of Her Child, 48
ARIZ. L. REV. 97, 116 (2006) (“The theory behind statutory rape is that a minor cannot
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Other commentators have noticed that gender-based stereotypes influence
the enforcement of statutory rape laws: “[s]pecifically, statutory rape laws are
enforced according to cultural stereotypes of women as sexual victims and men
as sexual aggressors.”73 The inexistence of judicial decisions that eliminate
child support obligations for male statutory rape victims also reveals that such
stereotypes exist; this is evidenced by the reasoning used in state court
decisions.74 This cultural stereotype may account for the reluctance of courts to
distinguish the claims of contraceptive fraud, sexual assault, and statutory rape
victims from those who voluntarily fathered a child and simply do not want to
pay. Courts’ and state legislatures’ failure to differentiate between all males
and victimized males enforces gender inequity in society.
These aforementioned cultural stereotypes reduce sympathy for male
victims and lead to judicial decisions that include statements such as: “[t]he law
should not except Nathaniel J. from this responsibility because he is not an
innocent victim [emphasis added] of Jones’s criminal acts. After discussing the
matter, he and Jones decided [emphasis added] to have sexual intercourse.
They had sexual intercourse approximately five times over a two week
period.”75
The family court judge here mischaracterized the situation, as evidenced
by the judicial decision’s word choice. Most notably, the court states that this
child, Nathaniel J., “decided” to have sex with a thirty-four-year-old woman,
even though the law does not recognize Nathaniel J.’s ability to make the
decision.76 Even if the judge thinks that Nathaniel J. “decided” to consent to
this crime which was committed on him, this is an individual, independent
determination that should not be recognized by the judicial system.
Additionally, had Nathaniel J. been a female victim of statutory rape, it is
doubtful that a court would decide that he was not an “innocent victim” or
mention his role in his own victimization.
When assessing the claims of male statutory rape victims, state courts
forget that Justice Blackmun’s observation in Roe v. Wade could apply to male
statutory rape victims too: “Maternity, or additional offspring, may force upon
the woman a distressful life and future. Psychological harm may be

legally consent to sex because of [his or] her young age. Among the important purposes of
statutory rape laws is the prevention of teenage pregnancy.”).
72. See generally infra Part V.B.iii.
73. Jones, supra note 68, at 412; see also London, supra note 28, at 1974, 1975
(“Ruth Jones explains that statutory rape laws were drafted—and are enforced—in light of
the female experience. . .Jones analyzes the failings of the strict liability in the context of
equality, primarily arguing that ‘while young men and young women are dissimilar in their
ability to become pregnant, they are similar in their need for protection by statutory rape
laws.’”).
74. See e.g., Cnty. of San Luis Obispo v. Nathaniel J., 50 Cal. App. 4th 843, 844 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1996).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 843-45. For more information on statutory rape, see infra Part V.B.iii.
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imminent.”77 Paternity, or additional offspring, may force a distressful life and
future upon the male statutory rape victim. Beyond the obvious financial and
emotional burden of raising a child at any age, “[p]sychologically, [child]
fathers are [especially] not necessarily ready to take a step toward
parenthood.”78 By absolving male statutory rape victims of child support
obligations, the legal system acts to prevent further victimization of the child.
Moreover, the assumption that a reduction in the father’s support
obligation directly correlates to a reduction in the child’s support, which is also
addressed in contraceptive fraud cases, arises in the statutory rape context. In
determining that a statutory rape victim was liable for child support, the Court
of Appeals of Wisconsin wrote, “[e]ven assuming that L.H. criminally
assaulted [the] appellant, child support is paid to benefit the child, not the
custodial parent. The custodial parent receives support payments in trust to be
used for the child’s welfare.”79 The decision to focus on the second, newborn
child as opposed to the victimized child is arbitrary and contrary to protection
of victims of statutory rape. If voluntary anonymous donors are statutorily
absolved of child support liability, then victims of statutory rape should also be
statutorily absolved of child support liability.
V.

POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO THE UNFAIR TREATMENT OF MALE SEXUAL
ASSAULT, CONTRACEPTIVE FRAUD, AND STATUTORY RAPE VICTIMS

Current child support guidelines need to be revised or judicial exceptions
to the guidelines recognized, in order to end the unfair treatment of male
contraceptive fraud, sexual assault, and statutory rape victims. This belief is
founded on a disagreement with state court views of child support. As an
initial matter, there are certain cases in which a natural parent should not be
“obligated” to pay child support due to a criminal matter (sexual assault,
statutory rape) or contraceptive fraud. Furthermore, anonymous donors are
“natural parents” who, if an “obligation” were justified, should be subject to the
same obligations as a natural parent who was involuntarily such a parent.
However, state law often absolves these “natural parents” of any obligation to
pay child support even though they willingly parented a child.

77. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
78. Annie Devault, Young Fathers Research Cluster Executive Summary: Father
Involvement Community Research Forum Spring 2006, FATHER’S INVOLVEMENT RESEARCH
ALLIANCE, http://fira.ca/cms/documents/50/Young_Fathers.pdf (last visited Jan. 30, 2012).
79. J.J.G. v. L.H.,149 Wis. 2d 349, 352, 441 N.W.2d 273, 276 (Wis. App. 1989)
(citing Francken v. State, 190 Wis. 424, 441, 209 N.W. 766, 772 (1926)); see Jevning v.
Chicos, 499 N.W. 515, 517 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993)). Some cases hold the opposite. See
Alice D. v. William M., 450 N.Y.S.2d 350, 354 (1982) (upholding a woman’s recovery for
an abortion:”[w]hile it is true that the alternative methods of birth control which the claimant
would have used had she not relied upon the defendant’s misrepresentation are not one
hundred percent effective, these methods are far superior to sexual intercourse without the
use of any contraception. Therefore the remote chance the pregnancy might have resulted in
any event is not sufficient to deny the claimant recovery.”).
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A.Compensation to Male Victims for the Use of their Biological Material
As noted in Figure 1 and the introductory discussion of the fertility
industry, sperm is an asset, at least when offered to a commercial entity
offering reproductive assistance. Anecdotally, the sexual assault context offers
the clearest example of why male victims of contraceptive fraud, sexual assault,
and statutory rape should, at least, be compensated for the nonconsensual use of
their sperm, by revealing some of the reasoning involved in these situations
preceding liability. In S.F. v. State ex rel. T.M., the case introduced in section
IV, a friend of the male victim who
testified that approximately two months later he had had a
conversation with T.M. in which she told him that she had had sex
with S.F. while he was passed out and that it had ‘saved her a trip to
the sperm bank.’ S.F. presented testimony from two other witnesses
who testified that they had heard T.M. brag about having sex with
S.F. while he was passed out. 80
It is clear from the testimony that S.F., the male sexual assault victim, did
not consent to the sex that “saved [T.M.] a trip to the sperm bank.” 81 Building
upon this example, as an initial matter, S.F. is entitled to a compensatory outlay
of money which would range between (a) the amount of money that he would
have received at the sperm bank for the donation and (b) the market price in his
area for a vial of sperm. I created a model statute to compensate these victims
not only inspired by fairness, but also because the property-based concept of
conversion is not available for a tort claim. 82 A statutory embodiment of this
compensatory concept, as follows, would be very simple when added to the
civil code of a state:
§1. Compensation for the unauthorized use of biological products
a. Men whose semen is obtained through misrepresentations of
sterility or the use of birth control, through statutory rape, or
through sexual assault are entitled to compensation for the use of
their biological products.
b. This compensation will be the highest of either

80. S.F. v. State ex rel. T.M., 695 So.2d 1186, 1188 (Ala. 1996).
81. Id.
82. Wallis v. Smith, 22 P.3d 682, 683 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001) (“Wallis sued Smith for
money damages, asserting four causes of action-fraud, breach of contract, conversion, and
prima facie tort-that the district court dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted.”); Sorrel v. Henson, No. 02A01-9609-JV-00212, 1998 WL 886561, at *3
(Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 18, 1998) (“The conversion claim likewise fails for lack of proof of
any agreement regarding the disposal of the semen.”); see also Phillips v. Irons, No. 05 L
4910, 2006 WL 4472185 (Ill. Cir. Apr. 18 2006) (“[The plaintiff] alleged that the Defendant
obtained sperm from the Plaintiff via oral sex and had herself inseminated with the Plaintiffs
sperm.”).
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the amount of money that the male would have received
for his sperm at a local donation center; or
the market price in his geographic location for a vial of
sperm.

B. A Revision of Child Support Guidelines that Result in Reduction or
Elimination of Child Support Liability
While courts are willing to punish men for crimes like statutory rape
without hesitation, courts and prosecutors are much more reluctant to punish
women for the same crimes. 83 For example, “a biological father who fails to
pay child support to his child’s mother faces the possibility of incarceration,
which is perhaps the ultimate deprivation of liberty.”84 Holding women
financially liable for their crimes that result in childbirth, through the
imposition of additional child support liability, equalizes the treatment of males
and females, especially since courts are not sentencing these women to time in
prison.85 The imposition of financial liability on women, the historical victim in
family law, recognizes that both males and females play important roles in the
abandonment of children, and that men are no longer the only aggressors as
previously thought.
i. Child Support Reduction or Elimination when Male Parentage is a Result of
Contraceptive Fraud
A reduction or elimination of the amount of child support that a noncustodial parent should pay is an appropriate response to an act that should be a
crime and is an action that does not reduce the support of the child. First, the
“best interests of the child” standard, a family law standard which underlies
83. See Jones, supra note 68, at 112 (“Specifically, statutory rape laws are being
enforced according to cultural stereotypes of women as sexual victims and men as sexual
aggressors.”); see also id. at 433 (“By enacting gender-neutral statutory rape laws, legislators
have ensured that both men and women can be prosecuted for committing the offense of
statutory rape. However, although an increasing number of women have been prosecuted for
statutory rape, there are continuing allegations that women are not treated the same as male
offenders. Specifically, there are allegations that authorities fail to perceive the sexual
relationship between an adult woman and a male adolescent as statutory rape, that women
are not prosecuted as often as men, and that women do not receive similar sentences. For
example, the Ventura County District Attorney’s web page, which describes statutory rape as
a gender-neutral crime, only discusses enforcement against men and gives the purpose of
enforcement as prevention of teenage pregnancy.”).
84. Bruno, supra note 34, at 159.
85. See, e.g., S.F., 695 So. 2d at 1189 (“We find S. F.’s argument to be without merit.
The child is an innocent party, and it is the child’s interests and welfare that we look to under
the Alabama Uniform Parentage Act. The purpose of this act is to provide for the general
welfare of the child; any wrongful conduct on the part of the mother should not alter the
father’s duty to provide support for the child. We note that the father could have filed
criminal charges against the mother.” [emphasis added] (citing § 13A-6-65, Ala. Code
1975.)).
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child support provisions, is not reduced by the reallocation of child support
income.86 Practically, courts conflate the child’s best interests with the
mother’s, by assuming that if a male is no longer parentally responsible, then
the child will not receive half of his or her support; 87 this is not the case. As
child support is an income-based calculation, not a reimbursement calculation
that ensures the allocation of fifty percent of a child’s actual expenses to each
parent, courts’ characterization of the removal of male support as a loss to the
child is not practical.88 Instead of apportioning the child’s actual expenses
between the two parents in an equal manner, the courts should view child
support as a mechanism for ensuring that the best interests of the child are
addressed, while also realizing that a re-apportionment of responsibility would
mean that women responsible for contraceptive fraud, statutory rape, or sexual
assault would use more of their actual income to provide for the child. Because
child support is not a fixed allocation of money for each child, regardless of
economic situation, but rather a percentage-based allocation, a parent who
disregards the procreative autonomy of another could use more of their income

86. See generally Lynne Marie Kohm, Tracing the Foundations of the Best Interests
of the Child Standard in American Jurisprudence, 10 J. L. AND FAM. STUD. 337 (2008)
(regarding the “best interests of the child” standard).
87. This conclusion stems from state court refusals to reduce or mitigate the child
support obligations of male contraceptive fraud victims. See e.g. Wallis, 22 P.3d at 684
(“Placing a duty of support on each parent has the added benefit of insulating the state from
the possibility of bearing the financial burden for a child. In our view, it is difficult to
harmonize the legislative concern for the child, reflected in the immutable duty of parental
support, with Wallis’s effort in this lawsuit to shift financial responsibility for his child
solely to the mother.”); see also Hughes v. Hutt, 455 A.2d 623, 625 (Pa. 1983) (“The only
issues which are to be considered in a support action continue to be the needs of the child
and the means of both parents Indeed, the possibility of fabricated accusations, the less than
certain effectiveness of birth control methods, and the fact that claims like appellant’s, if
successful, could result in the denial of support to innocent children whom the Support Law
was designed to protect, all illustrate that allegations of a mother’s failure to use birth control
have absolutely no place in a proceeding to determine child support.” (citing Conway v.
Dana, 456 Pa. 536, 540, 318 A.2d 324, 326 (1974))); Stephen K. v. Roni L., 164 Cal. Rptr.
618, 620 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) (“We are in effect asked to attach tortious liability to the
natural results of consensual sexual intercourse. Stephen’s claim is one of an alleged wrong
to him personally and alone. Procedurally and technically it is separate and apart from any
issue of either parent’s obligation to raise and support the child.”); L. Pamela P. v. Frank S.,
462 N.Y.S.2d 819, 820 ( Ct. App. N.Y. 1983) (“We agree with the Appellate Division that
the mother’s alleged deceit has no bearing upon a father’s obligation to support his child or
upon the manner in which the parents’ respective support obligations are determined. The
order of the Appellate Division should therefore be affirmed.”).
88. Katharine K. Baker, Bionormativity and the Construction of Parenthood, 42 GA.
L. REV. 649, 673 (2002); see Douglas R. v. Suzanne M., 487 N.Y.S.2d 244, 245 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1985) (“to allow one parent to utilize a plenary action to deflect the statutory obligation
onto the other would render [. . .the statute] nugatory”); see also Hughes, 455 A.2d at 625
(“claims like appellant’s [a contraceptive fraud victim’s], if successful, could result in the
denial of support to innocent children whom the Support Law [child support statute] was
designed to protect.”).
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to support the child than the law would usually prescribe.89 For example,
instead of seventeen percent of the father’s income going to the child’s
custodial parent for the child’s care (as required by New York’s child support
guidelines),90 a revised statute (as will be presented in Subsection D of this
Section, entitled “A Model Statute Combining the Latter Two Solutions”),
would change the guidelines so that the standard parental percentage
contribution would be reduced in exceptional cases, such as those involving
contraceptive fraud, sexual assault, and statutory rape. Similarly, a court order
or statute could reduce the amount of the father’s income going to the child
with the “loss” of support funding being composed of the mother’s income. 91
Thus, child support statutes would now include an additional provision
allowing for the reduction of the usual percentage contribution from the father.
ii. Child Support Reduction or Elimination When Male Parentage is a Result of
Sexual Assault
A criminal mother should not be able to “profit” from sexual assault and
the theft of a male’s sperm through child support payments from her victim,
which have the impact of reducing the burden on the mother of providing for
the child. Even though the child support payments are for the child, the mother
benefits from child support because she has to use less of her income to support
the child. Instead, the burden of raising a child, one which she undertook
herself, is one for which she should be solely responsible. Thus, the percentage
of the non-custodial parent’s contribution should be reduced, or eliminated, and
the criminal mother should use more of her disposable income to support the
child.
iii. Child Support Reduction or Elimination When Male Parentage is a Result
of Statutory Rape
Treating statutory rape victims in the same manner as anonymous donors
in artificial insemination statutes ends the second-guessing of criminal law by
family court judges. A statutory rape victim did not intend to create a child and,
under criminal law, could not consent to the act that resulted in the birth of the
child; as a result, he should not be liable for resultant child support outlays
from an illegal act.92

89. See, e.g., Child Support Guidelines, THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASS.: ADMIN.
OFFICE
OF
THE
TRIAL
COURT
(Jan.
1,
2009),
available
at
http://www.mass.gov/courts/childsupport/guidelines.pdf.
90. See Child Support Services, N.Y. STATE DIV. OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT,
https://www.childsupport.ny.gov/dcse/child_support_services.html#supportEstab
(last
visited Apr. 25, 2011).
91. Id.
92. See generally Jones, supra note 68, at 412; see e.g. County of San Luis Obispo v.
Nathaniel J., 50 Cal.App.4th 842 (Cal.Ct.App. 1996).
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Statutory rape victims should not be forced to participate in a system of
transfers from victims to various levels of government. While some women
who decide to birth a child are financially well-off, women whose income is
below a certain financial threshold are eligible to receive aid through
governmental welfare programs to support them.93 These governmental welfare
programs have additional components which impose additional burdens on
crime victims and imply tacit support for the further victimization of statutory
rape victims.94 Nathaniel J., already a victim of a crime, was sued by the San
Luis Obispo County District Attorney’s office for child support and for welfare
reimbursement. 95 This reimbursement would benefit the county, not Nathaniel
J.’s biological child whose financial support had already been provided by the
state. The state should not seek reimbursement from someone that its laws were
supposed to protect. Nathaniel J.’s attorney made a similar argument by
asserting that “exacting child support from a victim of statutory rape violates
public policy.”96 This claim was rejected by the California Court of Appeal.97
In effect, the county’s message is that Nathaniel J. is indeed a victim, but
his needs do not supersede the state’s financial health or the mandated support
guidelines benefitting the child he involuntarily, both factually and legally,
created.98 At the same time, the county revealed a quasi-sympathy with
93. See, e.g., Jones, supra note 68, at 412-5, 449-50.
94. See Jacqueline M. Fontana, Cooperation and Good Cause: Greater Sanctions and
the Failure to Account for Domestic Violence, 15 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 367, 368-9 (2000) (“In
an attempt to enforce child support, PRWORA [“the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 which eliminated Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC) and replaced it with Temporary Aid for Needy Families (TANF).”[citation
omitted]] requires that mothers who seek public assistance cooperate in establishing
paternity and child support. This is often referred to as the “cooperation requirement.” In
other words, a mother who seeks public assistance is required to supply information about
the father and appear at interviews, hearings, and legal proceedings to establish paternity.
Furthermore, both mother and child must submit to genetic testing ordered by a court or an
administrative agency. Failure to cooperate means a reduction in family benefits by at least
25%. In Wisconsin, failure to cooperate results in a complete loss of cash assistance. An
exception to child support enforcement exists when the mother has “good cause” for not
seeking child support.”).
95. Nathaniel J., 50 Cal. App. 4th at 844.
96. Id. at 844. Nathaniel J. also argued that a California constitutional provision
providing that “all
persons who suffer losses as a result of criminal activity shall have the right to restitution
from the persons convicted of the crimes for losses they suffer” applied to him, but this
argument was rejected by the Court of Appeal in favor of California child support law. Id.
97. Id.
98. Some courts focus their analysis on the rights of the newborn child to bring an
action. See, e.g., Linda D. and Baby Boy D.-C v. Fritz C., 687 P.2d 223, 227 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1984) (“The UPA, however, gives the child the right to bring an action for back
support, and requires that the child be made a party to the paternity and child support action
when instituted by the natural mother.” (citing Nettles v. Beckley, 32 Wash. App. 606, 609,
648 P.2d 508 (1982))). However, this does not ruin my argument because children are still
not allowed to institute these actions against their anonymous sperm donor fathers.
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Nathaniel J.’s position by deliberately not seeking enforcement of the child
support order until Nathaniel J. was an adult. 99 The county’s position is quasisympathetic because Nathaniel J. is not absolved of the child support
obligations that accrue during his childhood but is instead being given a grace
period, which he only obtained through litigation. 100 Otherwise, Nathaniel J.
would likely be forced to be a biological father, student, and minimum-wage
employee with all of his money going to support a child not much younger than
him. Or, perhaps Nathaniel J.’s parents would have had to pay the support
obligation on his behalf, which would add additional actors to this system of
transfers.
My model statute completely eliminates liability for children like
Nathaniel J. because even a reprieve on child support liability until the age of
majority is not particularly helpful; the U.S. Census Bureau in 1999 estimated
that the annual earnings of a worker with only a high school degree are
$25,900.101 This calculation was completed before the 2007-08 recession,
which rendered it even more difficult for college-educated adults to obtain
jobs.102 It is also commonly known that young parents often feel compelled to
take care of their children instead of pursuing higher education. Therefore,
Nathaniel J.’s future earning capacity may be impacted by his present child
support obligations.
Outside of California, other states hold statutory rape victims liable for
child support. In Minnesota, a female statutory rapist sued the child victim and
won, forcing the statutory rape victim to pay child support. 103 In Kansas, a
lower court required a statutory rape victim to reimburse the Department of
Social and Rehabilitation Services $7,000, but in an enforcement pattern
similar to that of the California government, the Kansas Social and
Rehabilitation Services (now the Department for Children and Families)104
actively planned to never collect the $7,000 award.105 The state of Kansas, like

99. Nathaniel J., 50 Cal. App. 4th at 846 (“[O]ur office is seeking to establish
paternity. We are not seeking a child support order. . .until such time as the minor becomes
an adult and is able to pay support.”).
100. Id.
101. Jennifer Cheeseman Day & Eric C. Newburger, The Big Payoff: Educational
Attainment and Synthetic Estimates of Work-Life Earnings, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 2 (July
2002), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/p23-210.pdf.
102. See Alan B. Krueger, The Job Market for College Graduates, ECONOMIX (Dec. 8,
2008),
http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/12/08/the-job-market-for-collegegraduates/.
103. Jevning v. Cichos, 499 N.W. 2d 515, 515 (Minn. App. 1993).
104.
KANSAS
DEPARTMENT
FOR
CHILDREN
AND
FAMILIES,
http://www.dcf.ks.gov/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Aug. 16, 2012).
105. State ex. Rel. Hermesmann v. Seyer, 847 P.2d 1273, 1280 (“When questioned in
oral argument about the policy of SRS in seeking a judgment in excess of $7,000, counsel
replied with the surprising statement that SRS had no intention of ever attempting to collect
its judgment. Under these circumstances, the reason for seeking that portion of the judgment
still eludes us.”).

278

WISCONSIN JOURNAL OF LAW, GENDER & SOCIETY

[Vol. 27:3

other states, successfully contended that the child father’s age is unrelated to
the question of biological fatherhood. If the purpose of statutory rape laws is to
protect children from being exploited by adults, then there is a serious flaw in
the application of these laws.
C.“Just Cause” Exception for Statutory Rape Victims
Adding a “just cause” exception to state law would be another way that
child support obligations could be eliminated for male victims. This is the least
drastic of the solutions in this paper because it focuses on child victims. A
Delaware case where a female incest victim was excused from child support
liability highlights an alternative, equitable method of excusing statutory rape
victims from child support liability. In DCSE/Esther M.C. v. Mary L., the
Delaware Family Court analyzed the Delaware code, which included a
provision stating “[n]o person shall be required to support another while he has
just cause for failing or refusing to do so.” 106 The Delaware Family Court held
that rape or incest qualified as “just cause.” 107 A “just cause” exception would
be less drastic than providing a blanket exception for all contraceptive fraud,
sexual assault, and statutory rape. The addition of a “just cause” exception
gives state courts specific authority to impose principles of equity. 108
The Delaware Family Court qualified the “just cause” exception with an
inquiry into the voluntariness of the sexual intercourse that formed the basis for
statutory rape. After distinguishing the DCSE/Esther M.C. v. Mary L. case from
other states’ cases involving male statutory rape victims, the court stated the
following rule:
To the contrary, in each of the cases, the respective court appeared to
infer from the factual assertions that the sexual intercourse was
voluntary. Where voluntary intercourse results in parenthood, then
for purposes of child support, the parenthood is voluntary. A parent’s
duty to support the child flows directly from his voluntary
parenthood.109

106. DCSE/Esther M.C. v. Mary L., No. 38812., 1994 WL 811732, at *2-3 (Del. Fam.
Ct. 1994). See also Jones, supra note 68, at 417-18 (discussing DCSE/Esther M.C. v. Mary
L.).
107. DCSE/Esther M.C., 1994 WL 811732 at *3.
108. Jones, supra note 68, at 447 (“Most child support laws have a general exemption
that permits courts to exclude some parents from child support obligations in the interest of
justice. However, given the difficulty in actually recovering support for children, courts have
been extremely reluctant to excuse parents from their child support obligations. Typically,
states have only permitted an exception for child support enforcement in circumstances
where the parent lacks the ability to pay or when pursuit of support could endanger the
mother, such as when the mother has been the victim of forcible rape or domestic
violence.”).
109. DCSE/Esther M.C., 1994 WL 811732 at *3; see also State ex re. Hermesmann v.
Seyer, 847 P.2d 1273, 1276 (Kan. 1993).

2012]

TREATMENT OF MALES IN FAMILY LAW

279

As a result, the case was remanded in order to determine whether actual
consent, not legal consent, was present. 110 This is a procedural step that
undermines statutory rape laws, which do not allow for consent by underage
individuals, which would create an additional inconsistency in family law; as
such, I would not include such a provision as an accompaniment to the “just
cause” exception. Adding a “just cause” exception to the law in states where
judges do not undertake such autonomous inquiries into the merits of a victim’s
case, however, could allow some victims to escape the unfortunate imposition
of child support liability.
D. A Model Statute Combining the Latter Two Solutions
This model statute adds language to an existing state statute. I included
the original statute here and added the suggested changes based on this paper’s
findings. The original statute is in normal font, and the edits are italicized. 111
. . . §1 (a) The anonymous donor of semen provided to a licensed
physician for use in artificial insemination of a woman other than the
donor’s wife shall be treated in law as if he were not the natural
father of a child thereby conceived. 112
(b) If a male child is deemed to be the victim of statutory rape, he
shall be treated in law as if he were not the natural father of a child
conceived. If a male is the victim of a sexual assault, he shall be
treated in law as if he were not the natural father of a child
conceived. If a male has failed to use contraception due to the
misrepresentations of his sexual partner, then he shall be treated in
law as if he were not the natural father of a child conceived.
The alternative to the last sentence of §1(b) addressing contraceptive fraud
is a provision that reduces, not eliminates, the child support liability of male:
If a male has failed to use contraception due to the
misrepresentations of his sexual partner, then his statutory child
support liability shall be half of the current child support allocation.
Therefore, a statute reducing child support liability or absolving male
contraceptive fraud, statutory rape, and sexual assault victims of child support
liability would parallel the current statutory language for anonymous sperm
donation. Additionally, addressing all four situations (anonymous sperm
donation, statutory rape, contraceptive fraud, and sexual assault) in the same
statute enables the public to see why these four situations should be treated
similarly.
110. DCSE/Esther M.C., 1994 WL 811732 at *3.
111. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 40/3 (2010).
112. Id.

280

WISCONSIN JOURNAL OF LAW, GENDER & SOCIETY

[Vol. 27:3

CONCLUSION
This article has analyzed three possible legal methods of compensating
male victims of contraceptive fraud, sexual assault, and statutory rape:
compensation for the use of biological products, reduction or elimination of
child support liability, and a “just cause exception”. Admittedly, these male
victims differ in terms of victimization from a societal perspective. That
difference matters because even judges, who should be impartial, make
determinations about the innocence of males in a situation that would spark an
outrage if women were the victims. Because of the stereotype of women as
victims and males as aggressors, in a hypothetical implementation timeline, it is
most likely that a “just cause” provision would be first introduced and followed
by a simple compensatory statute based on the value of biological products, as
these are the most conservative suggestions of the article. Unfortunately, this
“just cause” exception is also the easiest for a court to ignore.
Men who are victims of birth control fraud, 113 statutory rape, or sexual
assault should not be liable for child support and should instead be treated like
anonymous donors under artificial insemination statutes who receive
compensation for their biological products as a part of a $3 billion per year
industry.114 Granted, the economic aspects of reproduction are not novel. For
example, when the world was dominated by agricultural economies, children
were regarded as an additional labor source. Now, the fertility industry and
state governments profit from a person’s desire to be a parent, and through
reimbursements from statutory rape victims to the state and tax revenues from
the largely unregulated fertility industry. Inserting compensatory and
reallocation provisions into family law only recognizes the contemporary
realities of the fertility market’s impact on the community. The treatment of
male contraceptive fraud, statutory rape, and sexual assault victims as
anonymous donors reduces the prevalence of gender-based stereotypes in law,
prevents unhindered civil court dismissal of criminal law, prevents the state
from tacitly sanctioning fraud in parentage, and ends a system of transfers from
the victims whose laws the state aimed to protect to state and local
governmental bodies.

113. “Birth control fraud” is also called “contraceptive fraud.” See Sheldon, supra
note 2, at 460–80; see also Phillips v. Irons, No. 05 L 4910, 2006 WL 4472185 (Ill. Cir. Apr.
18, 2006); Adrienne D. Gross, A Man’s Right to Choose: Searching for Remedies in the
Face of Unplanned Fatherhood, 55 DRAKE L. REV. 1015, 1046 (2007) (discussing Phillips v.
Irons: “His claims for fraud and conversion of the sperm were dismissed, but the case was
remanded on the issue of intentional infliction of emotional distress that Phillips alleged
Irons’s actions had caused him.”).
114. See Dreifus, supra note 7; Orenstein, supra note 7; see also CAHN, supra note 18,
at 1; see generally SPAR, supra note 18.

